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1.  Introduction 
Carla Umbach 
University of Osnabrock 
It is well known that bare numerals license a specific, or referential reading, 
whereas modified numerals do not. For example, three boys in ( 1 a) can take wide 
scope over the subject NP resulting in a reading where three particular boys were 
visited by every girl, whereas at least three boys in ( 1b) cannot take wide scope. 
( I )  a .  Every girl visited three boys. 
b. Every girl visited at least three boys. 
The difference between (1a) and ( Ib) is commonly explained by the fact that 
scope inversion is possible if the NP has a referential reading. In general, the fact 
that a wide scope reading is available for bare numerals, but not for modified 
numerals, is taken to show that modified numerals, in contrast to bare numerals, 
cannot have a referential reading. In this paper a semantic explanation of the 
difference in referential behavior of bare and modified numerals will be given. 
Bare numerals consist of a number determiner and a (possibly complex) 
noun, e.g., three nice boys from Berlin. Modified numerals in addition include a 
preceding particle like at least, at most, more than, less than. In order to compare 
bare and modified numerals there are basically two options: Either the 
combination of particle and number word is regarded as a distinct determiner 
different from the number word determiner, cf. (2a). Then the difference in 
referential behavior has to be traced back to a difference in the semantics of 
theses determiners. Or the modified numeral is regarded as being composed of a 
bare numeral and a modifying particle, cf. (2b). In this case we have to answer the 
question of why the referential reading of the bare numeral is blocked by the 
modifier. 
(2) a. (DET at least three) (boys) 
b. (at least (NP three boys» 
In this paper we will consider three accounts relating to the contrast between bare 
and modified numerals: SzaboIci ( 1 997), de Swart ( 1 999), and Krifka ( 1 999). 
SzaboIcsi and de Swart regard bare numerals and modified numerals as 
comprising distinct determiners but provide different explanations for their 
semantic differences. Krifka adopts the second perspective. He suggests 
interpreting expressions like at least and at most as focus-sensitive adverbs, 
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which apply, amongst others, to bare numeral NPs. I t  will be shown that this 
interpretation, although intended to solve a problem not related to the referential 
behavior of bare and modified numerals, provides a natural explanation for the 
fact that in the case of the modified numeral the referential reading is blocked. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 Szabo1csi ' s  distinction 
between quantifier readings and referential readings is explained, and additional 
data from German are provided supporting her claim. Section 3 and 4 briefly look 
at the DRT representation of bare vs. modified numerals (cf. Kamp and Reyle 
1 993), and at the meaning of others and the other, which plays a prominent role in 
distinguishing quantificational and referential readings. In section 5, de Swart's  
identity criterion for referential (type e)  interpretations is discussed. In  section 6 
and 7, Krifka's interpretation of at least and the explanation for the behavior of 
modified numerals resulting from his account are presented. Finally, unresolved 
problems and questions for future analyses are identified. 
2. Quantificational vs. Referential Readings 
2. 1 .  Support of Non-Maximal Reference Anaphors 
Szabo1csi ( 1 997) argues against a uniform treatment of noun phrases employing a 
single "semantically blind" rule of scope assignment. She is mainly concerned 
with Hungarian data but her claims also pertain to English. Based on Beghelli ' s  
and Stowell 's  ( 1 997) proposal for LF positions in  English, Szabolcsi shows that 
the interpretation of an NP may vary according to its position in LF, where some 
NPs may occur in more than one position while others are restricted to a single 
position. We will focus on the semantic aspects of this account: Szabo1csi 
assumes that there are basically two options for the interpretation of a noun 
phrase: Either it contributes an entity to the interpretation of the sentence which 
serves as a (logical) subject of predication, or it performs a counting operation on 
the property denoted by the rest of the sentence. 1 In the former case the NP 
denotes an (atomic or plural) individual corresponding to a minimal witness set of 
the NP, in the latter case it denotes a generalized quantifier. We will call the first 
reading referential and the second one quantificational. 
The question of whether a noun phrase must be interpreted 
quantificationally or may also allow a referential interpretation, first of all 
depends on monotonicity properties. Noun phrases corresponding to monotone 
decreasing or non-monotone quantifiers can only achieve a quantificational 
interpretation. Noun phrases corresponding to monotone increasing quantifiers 
may achieve a referential interpretation (depending on their LF position). This is 
explained by the fact that upward monotonicity guarantees that using a minimal 
witness set preserves truth conditions. However, modified numerals like at least / 
more than three boys, although monotone increasing, do not license a referential 
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interpretation. Thus Szabolcsi requires an additional characteristic for NPs to 
achieve a referential interpretation, which is support of non-maximal reference 
anaphors. It is demonstrated in (3). 
(3) a. Two boys were selling coke. They were wearing black jackets. 
Perhaps there were others ( . . .  but I didn't notice). 
b. At least two boys were selling coke. They were wearing black jackets. 
# Perhaps there were others ( . . .  but I didn't notice). 
In (3a) the pronoun they may refer to a subset of the boys selling coke. There may 
have been more than two boys selling coke, but the pronoun need not refer to all 
of them, which is indicated by the continuing sentence "Perhaps there were 
others . . .  " (that is, other boys selling coke, cf. section 4). Thus the bare numeral 
in (3a) supports non-maximal reference anaphors. In (3b) the pronoun they must 
refer to the entire set of boys selling coke. For this reason the continuation 
"Perhaps there were others . . . " is infelicitous. Obviously, the modified numeral in 
(3b) supports only maximal reference anaphors. 
To provide a semantic representation, Szabolcsi employs (a modified 
version of) DRT.2 The distinction between a referential and a quantificational 
reading is reflected by the DRT distinction between the direct introduction of a 
discourse referent and the introduction of a duplex condition plus subsequent 
abstraction operation (cf. section 3). Support of non-maximal reference anaphors 
indicates that the NP directly introduces a discourse referent, without making use 
of the properties given in the rest of the sentence. This is why support of non­
maximal reference anaphors indicates that the NP has a referential reading. 
In other words, there are two requirements for a numeral to get a 
referential interpretation, upward monotonicity and support of non-maximal 
reference anaphors. Support of non-maximal reference anaphors provides an 
adequate descriptive criterion to distinguish between bare numerals and 
(increasing) modified numerals, filtering out, e.g., at least / more than three boys. 
Still, it does not offer a semantic explanation of why modified numerals cannot 
have a referential interpretation.3 
2.2. German Numerals in Topic Position 
In Umbach (2004a) it is shown that German bare numerals in topic position, with 
a focus on the determiner, facilitate two readings, a quantificational one and a 
specific, or referential one. These readings differ with respect to the alternatives 
evoked by the focus, which are indicated in the respective continuations. Consider 
(4a) and (b). Mr. Paul and Mr. Griin are supposed to be local business men in 
some small town, who have been asked to provide internships for a group of local 
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students. (Accents on the relevant determiners are capitalized, other accents are 
omitted.) 
(4) a. Mr. Paul: 
ZWEI Schiiler wilrde ich nehmen. Aber fiinf [SchUler] sind mir zuviel. 
' I  would take two students but five are too many for me. ' 
b. Mr. Griin: 
ZWEI Schiiler wilrde ich nehmen. Die anderen [SchUler] lieber nicht. 
' I  would take two of the students. The others I'd rather not take. ' 
In Mr. Paul' s  answer in (4a) the bare numeral NP ZWEI Schuler 'two students' is 
in contrast with flin! [Schiiler) 'five students ' .  Thus the alternative set triggered 
by the NP consists of student-quantifiers of different cardinality: {one student, 
two students, three students . . .  }, indicating that the NP is interpreted quantifica­
tionally. In Mr. Griin's  answer in (4b) the NP ZWEI Schiiler is in contrast with die 
anderen [Schiiler) 'the other students ' .  ZWEI Schiiler refers to a particular 
subgroup of a previously mentioned student group, and die anderen [Schuler) in 
the second sentence refers to the complement (cf. section 4). In this case the 
alternative set triggered by ZWEI Schiiler comprises two elements, which are both 
(plural-)individuals: {two of the students, the other students} ,  indicating that the 
NP has a referential reading. 
Taking the two readings of the bare numeral into account it is predicted 
that modified numerals will be appropriate in contexts like (4a), when contrasted 
with another quantifier, but that they are infelicitous in (4b). This is confirmed by 
the data. In (5) Mindestens / mehr als ZWEI Schiiler 'at least/more than two 
students' is contrasted with hochstens flin! [Schiiler) ' at most five students' ,  
which is  acceptable. (Note, however, that the second quantifier has to  be a 
modified numeral instead of a bare numeral.) In (6) Mindestens / mehr als ZWEI 
Schiiler is contrasted with die anderen [Schiiler), which is not acceptable. 
(5) Mr. Paul: 
Mindestens I mehr als ZWEI Schiiler wilrde ich nehmen. Aber hochstens 
fiinf. 
'I would take at least Imore than two students but at most five. '  
(6) Mr. Griin: 
# Mindestens I mehr als ZWEI Schiiler wilrde ich nehmen. Die anderen 
lieber nicht. 
'I would take at least I more than two students. The others I'd rather not 
take. '  
These examples support Szabolsci's claim that bare numerals may have a 
quantificational and a referential reading and present further evidence for the fact 
that modified numerals license only quantificational interpretations. They provide 
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another test for the support of non-maximal reference anaphors slightly differing 
from SzaboIcsi 's in that they function without an additional pronoun and make 
use of the defInite complement anaphor die anderen 'the others ' .  
3. Introduction o f  Discourse Referents vs. Introduction o f  Duplex Conditions 
Concerning numerals, standard DRT doesn't allow two different interpretations of 
bare numerals - three boys are uniformly interpreted by introducing a plural 
discourse referent. But modifIed numerals are interpreted in a different way. 
Instead of introducing a discourse referent they introduce a duplex condition. This 
accounts for the fact that modifIed numerals support only maximal reference 
anaphors. Compare (7) and (8): 
(7) a. Two boys were selling coke. They were wearing black jackets. 
b. X Y  
boy (X) 
sell-coke (X) 
IXI = 2  
Y=X 
wear-black-jackets(Y) 
(8) a. At least two boys were seIling coke. They were wearing black jackets. 
b. X Y  
x 
X=D: boy (x) 
sell-coke (x) 
Y=X 
wear-black-jackets (Y) 
sell-coke (x) 
The bare numeral in (7) introduces a plural discourse referent X which is the 
antecedent for the pronoun in the second sentence. This referent is subject to the 
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conditions given by the NP, that is, it has to be a group of two boys. The modified 
numeral in (8) introduces a duplex condition. To interpret the pronoun an 
antecedent is belatedly formed by abstraction. Note that the discourse referent 
formed by abstraction makes use of the restrictor and the nuclear scope of the 
duplex condition. It includes all boys who were selling coke. This is why the 
pronoun in (8) must be a maximal reference anaphor, whereas the one in (7) may 
be non-maximal referring to any subset of coke-selling boys with two elements. 
Thus, the DRT distinction between, on the one hand, directly introducing a 
discourse referent, and on the other hand, introducing a duplex condition perfectly 
captures Szabo1csi's claim that a noun phrase either contributes an entity which is  
subject to  a predication, or  it performs a counting operation on the property given 
in the reminder of the sentence.4 Still, this doesn't explain why bare and modified 
numerals differ the way they do. 
4. (The) Others 
Since in the example in (3), which demonstrates support of (non-)maximal 
reference anaphors, the NPs others / the others play an important role, we will 
take a brief look at their interpretation. Following Kamp (2001)  other is an 
adjective denoting the property of being distinct from another individual. Being 
distinct is represented by a two-place predicate, #, where "a#/3" is false if a and /3 
are identical, or one of them is included in the other one (where a and /3 represent 
atomic or plural individuals). Since being different presupposes some kind of 
similarity, a and /3 must share a common property C (which has to be 
backgrounded).5 
Without going into details, let us assume that others is an indefmite NP 
including an implicit head noun (other Ns). It introduces a (plural) discourse 
referent X which has to be distinct from a presupposed co-referent /3 s1,lch that 
they share a common property (corresponding to the implicit head noun): X#/3, 
C(X), C(/3). 
In the example in (3a), repeated in (9a), the co-referent is  clearly the 
referent of the pronoun they, that is, the discourse referent denoted by three boys. 
Thus the property to be shared is the property of being a boy. Accordingly, the 
NP others introduces a group of boys distinct from the three boys introduced in 
the first sentence. Similarly, in (9b)(=3b) the preferred co-referent is the referent 
of the pronoun they. In this case it refers to a discourse referent established by 
abstraction, including all boys selling coke. Thus the property to be shared should 
be the property of being a boy selling coke. But then a conflict arises because 
others introduces a discourse referent which shares the property of being a boy 
selling coke and at the same time is required to be distinct from all boys selling 
coke. This is why the continuation in (9b) is not acceptable. 
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There is, however, a caveat concerning the use of others in (9b): It might 
also be interpreted with respect to a different common property, as for example 
other persons selling coke, cf. (9c). In this case the referent established by 
abstraction is a perfect co-referent, and hence the third sentence is an acceptable 
continuation. (Note that this interpretation is facilitated by an accent on boys.) 
(9) a. Two boys were selling coke. They were wearing black jackets. 
Perhaps there were others ( . . .  but I didn't notice). 
b. At least two boys were selling coke. They were wearing black jackets. 
# Perhaps there were others ( . . .  but I didn't notice). 
c. At least two boys were selling coke. They were wearing black jackets. 
Perhaps there were other persons also selling coke, but I didn't notice. 
A similar caveat applies to the examples in (4b) and (6), repeated in ( l Oa,b). Here 
we find a definite NP (die anderen, 'the others'), thus requiring maximality with 
respect to the common property C minus the co-referent. Similar to (9b), the co­
referent is established by abstraction comprising all students of the 
aforementioned student group accepted by Mr. Griin, which does not allow for a 
complement denoted by die anderen. As before, this conflict is the reason why the 
continuation in ( lOb) is not acceptable. In ( lOc), however, an apposition is 
inserted naming the students Mr. Griin has in mind. Due to the insertion the 
continuation is considerably improved. Now die anderen 'the others' can be 
interpreted as the students different from the grandsons of Griin's neighbour. 
( 1 0) Mr. Griin: 
a. ZWEI SchUler wiirde ich nehmen. Die anderen lieber nicht. 
'1 would take two of the students. The others I 'd rather not take . '  
b.  # Mindestens ZWEI Schuler wiirde ich nehmen. Die anderen lieber 
nicht. 
'1 would take at least two of the students. The others I 'd  rather not 
take . '  
c .  Mindestens ZWEI Schuler wiirde ich nehmen, nlimlich die Enkel 
meines Nachbarn. Die anderen lieber nicht. 
'1 would take at least two of the students, namely the grandsons of my 
neighbour. The others I'd rather not take. '  
It  is important to note that, contrary to what is  often said in the literature, the 
namely-insertion does not indicate a specific, or referential reading in ( lOc) . 
Instead it indicates a general problem with namely-insertions: They can be used 
even if the NP is clearly quantificational, cf. ( 1 1). Most and few are above 
suspicion concerning referential readings because they denote a strong and a 
downward monotone determiner, respectively. The namely-insertion introduces a 
discourse referent which is identified with a referent established by abstraction. 
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This is why in (1 1 )  the participants in the final meeting are identical to the 
speaker' s  students who passed the exam. 
( 1 1 ) Most/few students of mine passed the exam, namely those who 
participated in the fmal meeting. The others failed. 
5. The Identity Criterion 
In de Swart ( 1 999) a classification of indefinite NPs is proposed which is based 
on semantic properties of the NP denotations. Adopting a type shifting 
perspective where NPs may have a family of interpretations of type e, type <e,t>, 
and type « e,t>,t> (cf. Partee 1987), three classes of indefinites are distinguished: 
Class I indefmites are weak, that is, felicitous in existential contexts. They are 
interpreted as generalized quantifiers (type « e,t>,t» and they must have a 
denotation which, after application of Partee's  type shifting operator BE, is  
neither empty nor a singleton. This characterization filters out strong quantifiers 
and also definite NPs. Class II indefinites constitute a subclass of class 1. They are 
referential in the sense that they pick out a (possibly plural) individual thereby 
establishing a discourse referent. Thus their denotation is of type e. Class III 
indefinites, which are also a subclass of weak indefinites, may appear in a 
predicative position and are interpreted as properties (type <e,t» . 
We will focus on class II indefmites. Being monotone increasing is a 
necessary but not sufficient criterion, since modified numerals have to be 
excluded. In connection with this problem, de Swart poses the question of why 
bare numerals have a type e denotation but modified numerals have not, which is 
the central question in this paper. Adopting Link's ( 1 983) ontology where (plural) 
individuals constitute a join-sernilattice, de Swart assumes a partitioning of the 
domain according to the size of the individuals, i.e. the number of atoms 
constituting the individuals. Thus the cells include all and only individuals of the 
same size. 
Bare and modified numerals are then distinguished by their ability to 
identify a particular cell. Whereas three boys identifies the particular cell 
containing individuals of size three, at least three boys cannot identify a particular 
cell, since its denotation includes sets of various sizes. In general, indefmites 
which identify a particular cell may have a type e denotation and thus qualify as 
referential (class II) indefinites. This is called the identity criterion, and is in a 
sense the counterpart to Szabo\csi 's  support of non-maximal reference criterion. 
There are two objections: First, some boys clearly licenses a referential 
interpretation but fails to identify a particular cell in the same-size partitioning. 
De Swart actually concedes that in order to extend her idea to some N and many N 
some room for vagueness has to be allowed in the way the partitioning is built up. 
However, if the partitioning is weakened to allow for some N to identify a 
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particular cell, then there is no reason why at least three N should not do so. To 
put it another way, the fact that some N is not able to identify a cell is evidence 
that licensing a type e denotation does not require a natural number size. 
Secondly, de Swart further weakens her account by allowing the 
partitioning of the domain to depend on the context. Although the same-size 
partitioning is clearly the most natural one, particular contexts may then impose a 
'degenerate' partitioning involving only two cells, e.g., individuals with n or more 
atoms and individuals with less than n atoms. The reason for this are examples 
which seem to indicate that, in certain contexts, modified numerals (even if non­
monotone or monotone decreasing) may license referential readings. A discussion 
of these, however, lies beyond the scope of this paper.6 In any case, attributing the 
lack of a referential interpretation to the failure to identify a particular cell seems 
to shift the burden to the partitioning of the domain without providing an 
explanation. 
6. At least as a Focus-Sensitive Operator 
The accounts in Szabolsci ( 1 997) and de Swart ( 1999) both viewed three and at 
least three as different determiners with a possibly different semantics. Krifka 
( 1 999) adopts a compositional perspective interpreting at least as an operator 
which can be applied to, amongst others, bare numeral phrases. Krifka's  paper 
focuses on the problem that, in spite of the fact that their meaning seems to be the 
same, bare numerals and modified numerals trigger different scalar implicatures. 
According to Generalized Quantifier Theory (Barwise and Cooper 1 9 8 1 ), both 
three boys and at least three boys denote quantifiers which allow for more than 
three elements in the intersection of the restrictor and the nuclear scope. 
Nevertheless, ( l 2a), but not ( 12b), triggers the implicature that no more than three 
boys are selling coke. 
( 1 2) a. Three boys are selling coke. 
b. At least three boys are selling coke. 
Krifka assumes that scalar implicatures are induced by alternatives. Asserting a 
sentence with a meaning M, the speaker conveys the information that she is not 
willing to assert any of the proper alternatives triggered by M (that is, any 
alternative M'*M), either because the alternative statement is more informative 
than M violating the Maxim of Quality, or because it is less informative violating 
the Maxim of Quantity. ( 12a), for example, given a focus on the number word, 
triggers alternatives of the form "n boys are selling coke", for nEN.  By asserting 
( 1 2a) the speaker simultaneously conveys the information that she lacks evidence, 
or has counterevidence, for any number n >  3, and that she has evidence that 
n > 2. 
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Concerning at least, Kritka's analysis starts from two observations. 
First, the meaning of at least is sensitive to accent. This is demonstrated in ( 1 3) 
(Kritka's example 14). ( 13a) means that the number of boys that left is at least 
three, while ( 1 3b), assuming that the focus includes three boys, means that the 
persons that left include three boys. 
(13)  a. At least THREEF boys left. 
b. At least [three BOYS]F left. 
Secondly, unlike genuine determiners like every, some and most, expressions like 
at least, at most, less than, more than, exactly combine, e.g., with NPs, adjectives, 
and VPs, cf. ( 14a-f) (Kritka's  example 1 6- 1 8).7 
( 14) a. John saw at least Mary. 
b. The aggressors wanted more than the southern province. 
c. Mary was at least satisfied. 
d. We are more than happy to serve you. 
e. The guest at least left early. 
f. He at most spanked the child. 
These data suggest that there is a general meaning of at least which operates on a 
focus, similar to the focus-sensitive adverb only, such that the meaning of at least 
three boys is composed of the general meaning of at least and the meaning of 
three boys. 
Krifka adopts the two dimensional-interpretation of focus suggested by 
Rooth ( 1 992) where any expression a has an alternative meaning [[aDA in 
addition to its ordinary meaning [[alf. The alternative meaning of a focused 
expression consists in the set of alternatives triggered by the ordinary meaning, 
and is projected to the alternative meaning of composed expressions. Different 
from Rooth, Krifka assumes alternative sets to be partially ordered by, e.g., the 
order on natural numbers or the part-of relation on plural individuals or a concept 
taxonomy, depending on the context. The ordering is preserved in the 
composition of complex alternative meanings. 
For number determiners the ordering is naturally given by natural 
numbers. Hence the alternative meaning of three boys consists of pairs 
(representing the ordering relation) of m boys and n boys for all m, n in N. ( 1 5) 
demonstrates the ordinary meaning and the alternative meaning of three boys. 8 
( 1 5) a. [[THREEF boys]f = A.Q 3X. IXI �3 " boy(X) " Q(X) 
b. [[THREEF boYS]]A = {<A.Q 3X· IXI � " boy(X) " Q(x), 
A.Q 3X. IXI � "  boy(X) " Q(X» I n �N m} 
267 
268 Carla Umbach 
The general meaning of at least aimed at in Krifka's paper has to fulfill two 
requirements: It has to apply to the denotations of NPs, adjectives, VPs etc. in 
order to cover the examples in ( 14), and it must use up the alternatives given by 
the alternative meaning of the argument in order to prevent unwanted 
impJicatures. The basic idea is that general meaning of at least consists in the 
union of the argument's  alternatives which are greater than the argument' s  
ordinary meaning. This i s  the reason why alternative sets come with an ordering 
relation. To fulfill the second requirement the alternative meaning of at least is 
defined in such a way that no proper alternatives, different from the ordinary 
meaning, survive. The definition of general meaning of at least is given in ( 1 6). 
( 16) a. ([at least a]]o = v {P I <([a]]o, P> E ([a]]A } 
b. ([at least a]]A = {a , <a , a >} 
The union operation in (1 6a) is the general join, cf. Keenan and Faltz ( 1 985). We 
will come back to this in the next section. The alternative meaning in ( 1 6b) is 
called the "standard alternatives". It is defmed this way for purely technical 
reasons and does not include any proper alternatives. ( 1 7) shows the result of 
applying at least to three boys. Note that concerning the ordinary meaning, the 
result does not differ from the standard interpretation of at least three boys. 
( 1 7) ° a. ([at least [THREEF boys] )) 
° A = V {P I <[[THREEF boys)) , P> E [[THREEF boys]] } 
= v {AQ 3X. IXI �n 1\ boy(X) 1\ Q(X) I n �3} 
= AQ 3X. IXI �3 1\ boy(X) 1\ Q(X) 
b. ([at least [THREEF boys] ))
A = the standard alternatives 
7. The Problem of the Blocked Referential Interpretation 
The meaning of at least given in ( 16) neatly solves Krifka's problem of the 
missing scalar implicature. While the sentence Three boys are selling coke. 
generates a set of proper alternatives (n boys are selling coke, n E N, n,.t3) leading 
to the implicature that they are deliberately not claimed by the speaker, the 
sentence At least three boys are selling coke. doesn't generate any proper 
alternatives and hence there is no scalar implicature. 
At the same time, the meaning of at least given in ( 1 6) provides a natural 
solution for the problem addressed in this paper, that is, the problem of why 
modified numerals resist a referential interpretation. Recall the defmition of the 
general join operation by Keenan and Faltz ( 1 985), given in ( 1 8): 
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( 1 8) i. If<l>, 'I' are sentences (type t), then ([<1>)) v [['P]) = [[<I> v 'I'J); 
ii. if a, 13 are expressions of type <cr, 't>, 
then [[a)) v [[(3)) = AX. [[a))(X) v ([J3))(X); 
iii. If S is a set of meanings of a type that can be conjoined by v, 
vS is the result of conjoining all elements of S by v. 
The general join operation is a kind of polymorphic disjunction. Making it the 
basis of the meaning of at least amounts to interpreting at least as a disjunction of 
the argument' s  alternatives (greater or equal to the ordinary meaning of the 
argument). According to this interpretation At least three boys are selling coke. 
can be paraphrased as ( l 9a) or ( 1 9b). Hence we will call it the disjunctive 
interpretation of at least. 
( 1 9) a. Three boys are selling coke, or four boys are selling coke, or . . .  
b. Three boys or four boys or . . .  are selling coke. 
Being defined by disjunction the general join operation is restricted to conjoinable 
types (roughly speaking, types which end in type t, cf. Partee and Rooth 1 983). It 
can be applied to type <e,t> denotations, i.e. properties, and also to type « e,t>,t> 
denotations, i.e. quantifiers. But it cannot be applied to type e denotations, i.e. 
individuals. Let us follow Partee ( 1987) in assuming that an NP like three boys 
comes with a family of interpretations of type e, <e,t>, and « e,t>,t>. If ([three 
boys)) is of type <e,t>, then ([at least three boys)) is of type <e,t>. If [[three boys)) 
is of type «e,t>,t> then [[at least three boys)) is of type « e,t>,t>. But if ([three 
boys)) is of type e, the general join operation is undefined. Assuming the 
disjunctive interpretation, at least can never be applied to an individual, and at 
least three boys can never denote an individual. 
The fact that the disjunctive interpretation of at least excludes individuals 
both as an argument and as a result is, in the first place, a side effect of the 
general join operation and its type restrictions. So one might wonder whether it is 
just a question of playing around with type assignments. Note, however, that the 
core of the meaning of at least is a disjunction. No matter whether you work in a 
typed system or an untyped one, if an operation combines denotations by 
disjunction, individuals will always be excluded, because there is no way to 
combine individuals by disjunction.9 
This of course raises the question of how to interpret NPs like at least 
John , as in (20a). In order to apply at least to proper name NPs let us assume that 
the ordering of alternatives is given by the part-of relation :;;i on plural individuals 
(cf. Link 1 983, 'jEBk' denotes the sum of the individuals j and k). According to 
this ordering john :;;i johnEBbili :;;i johnEBbiliEBfred etc. Thus the alternative 
meaning of John in (20a) consists of the part-of relation on individuals, cf. (20b). 
Since at least cannot be applied to individuals, the ordinary meaning as well as 
the elements of the alternative meaning of John have to be type lifted to quantifier 
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denotations, cf. (20c). The composition of at least and John is then straight­
forward yielding a quantifier as a result, cf. (20d). 
(20) a. At least John is selling coke ( . . .  maybe also Bill). 
b. [[JOHNllo = john 
[[JOHNlt = {<x,y> I x :5:; y} 
c.  [[JOHNt = AP. P(john) 
[[JOHNllA = {<AP. P(x), AP. P(y» I x � y} 
d. [[at least JOHNllo 
= u {P I <[[JOHNllo, P> E [[JOHNIIA } 
= U {AP. P(x) I john �i x} 
= AP. (P(john) v P(johnESbill) v P(johnESbillESfred v . . .  ) 
= AP. (3x. john � x 1\ P(x» 
It is important to recognize that type lifting is not a repair strategy. Instead, it 
reflects the fact that the meaning of at least is based on disjunction. This is the 
primary reason why the proper name in (20a) must be interpreted as a quantifier. 
In general, it' s  the primary reason why NPs modified by at least, in particular 
modified numerals, must be interpreted as quantifiers. Consider DRT. In DRT 
modified numerals are interpreted as quantifiers, which is a posteriori justified 
because it yields the correct results concerning anaphoric accessibility: Modified 
numerals support only maximal reference anaphors (cf. section 3). Accepting the 
disjunctive interpretation of at least, we can argue for a quantifier interpretation 
from the beginning, and the accessibility facts tum out to be a consequence of this 
interpretation. 
8. Explicit Disjunction 
Tracing back the problem of the blocked referential interpretation of modified 
numerals to the disjunctive interpretation raises the question of explicit 
disjunction. Similar to noun phrases modified by at least, noun phrases combined 
by disjunction should not license a wide scope reading and should not support 
non-maximal reference anaphors. Regarding scope this prediction is easily 
confirmed: (2 1 )  does not allow for a wide scope interpretation. 
(2 1 )  Every girl kissed three boys o r  four boys. 
WHY Do MODIFIED NUMERALS REsIST A REFERENTIAL INTERPRETATION? 
Regarding support of non-maximal reference anaphors, the data are more 
complex. Let us fIrst consider proper names. The example in (22) is felicitously 
continued by "Perhaps there are others . . .  ", indicating that the NP John or Bill 
does support non-maximal reference anaphors. But the pronoun they clearly refers 
to the sum of John and Bill, and the co-referent of others is johnEBbill, that is, 
others refers to persons distinct from John and from Bill. So the others-test fails 
with this type of example. Still, the fact that the pronoun inevitably refers to the 
sum of John and Bill is good reason to argue that John or Bill cannot have a 
referential reading. 
(22) John or Bill are selling coke. They are wearing black jackets. 
Perhaps there are others also selling coke ( . . .  but I didn't notice). 
The problematic case is the one in (23) where numbers are combined by 
disjunction. The continuation with "Perhaps there are others . . . " is acceptable, 
and the others are clearly boys distinct from the three or four boys mentioned in 
the fIrst sentence. Thus the NP does license a referential interpretation. Is (23) a 
counterexample to our claim that individuals cannot be combined by disjunction? 
(23) Three or four boys are selling coke. They are wearing black jackets. 
Perhaps there are others also selling coke ( . . .  but I didn't notice). 
Intuitively, three or four boys in (23) is very much like some boys, which also has 
a referential reading. From this point of view, three or four boys does not denote 
the coordination of two specifIc groups of boys, i.e. three particular boys or four 
particular boys. Instead, the disjunction seems to indicate that the speaker is not 
quite sure about the number of boys. Similarly, the disjunction in (24) denotes a 
single car, the color of which the speaker is uncertain about. Quirk et al. ( 1 985) 
even attribute an idiomatic function to numerals coordinated with or, three or 
four meaning 'approximately in the range of three or four' .  In fact, substituting 
ten for four, the use of others in (23) gets considerably less acceptable. This is 
sufficient reason to regard (23) as introducing a single discourse referent with a 
cardinality in the range of three or four instead of combining two individuals by 
disjunction. 
(24) Bill rented a / the blue or green car from the garage in Tempelhof. 
9. Conclusion 
It has been argued in this paper that the question of why modifIed numerals like at 
least three boys resist a referential interpretation is easily solved by adopting the 
disjunctive interpretation of at least proposed in Krifka ( 1 999). Based on 
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disjunction, it predicts that at least can never combine with and never result. in an 
individual, i.e. type e, expression. It has been emphasized that this is not a mere 
technical solution making use of a particular type system but reflects the basic 
fact that individuals cannot be combined by disjunction to form a new individual. 
Solving a widely discussed problem coincidentally is substantial evidence 
for Krifka's  account. Still, it raises some questions. First, it is claimed that at least 
phrases do not trigger any proper alternatives, which is crucial for solving the 
problem of the missing scalar implicature. lo  This is hard to maintain when taking 
contrastive statements into consideration. If we assume that the elements in 
contrast have to be mutual alternatives (cf. Umbach 2004b), examples like (25) 
show that modified numerals do trigger alternative sets. 
(25) At least five boys are wearing black jackets, but at most three / less 
than three / only three are selling coke. 
Secondly, in Krifka ( 1999) it is taken for granted that the interpretation proposed 
for at least also applies to more than, which has been tacitly accepted in this 
paper. It has been found recently, however, that there are various contexts in 
which superlative quantifiers (at least / at most n N ) and comparative quantifiers 
(more / less than n N) differ both in distribution and in meaning. For example, 
Nouven (2004) and Geurts (2005) both point out that, in downward entailing 
contexts, superlative quantifiers are less acceptable than comparative ones, and 
they claim that superlative quantifiers, but not comparative ones, introduce modal 
operators. I I  
Taking a modal interpretation of disjunction into account, as e.g. proposed 
by Zimmermann (2000), 12 it suggests itself to derive the modal interpretation of 
superlative quantifiers from their disjunctive interpretation, which would confirm 
both the disjunctive and the modal interpretation. On the other hand, such a 
correspondence would imply that for comparative quantifiers, which are clearly 
no modals, the disjunctive interpretation is inadequate. But then the solution to 
the problem of the blocked referential interpretation suggested in this paper 
cannot apply to modified numerals which comprise comparative quantifiers, and 
we have to return to the initial question in this paper asking why more than three 
boys does not license a referential reading. 
Endnotes 
* I would like to thank Regine Eckardt, Graham Katz and Manfred Krifka, three 
anonymous referees and the audience at SALT for helpful criticism and valuable 
comments. 
WHY Do MODIFIED NUMERALS REsIST A REFERENTIAL INTERPRETATION? 
I In a side remark, Szabolcsi relates this distinction to the distinction between 
categorial and thetic sentences. 
2 Szabolcsi departs from standard DRT in using sorted variables for discourse 
referents where the sort is given by a minimal witness set. 
3 In Ebert and Endriss (2004), a 'topic condition' is proposed characterizing the 
class of quantifiers that can be interpreted referentially and thus qualifY as topics .  
Similar to Szabolcsi, Ebert and Endriss make crucial use o f  the fact that 
referential readings support non-maximal anaphors. 
4 In addition to abstraction, there is another operation to form plural antecedents 
in DRT called summation which forms the sum of individuals, similar to Link's 
( 1983) summation operator. Summation is close to direct introduction of 
discourse referents in that it relates only to the conditions imposed on the 
antecedents, but not to conditions introduced by, e.g., the VP. Viewing two ways 
to form a plural antecedent as redundancy, Hardt (2004) suggested a general 
mechanism based on inference. A general mechanism of plural formation would, 
however, miss an important distinction, namely whether antecedents are given by 
one (or more) referential phrases or by quantification, which is decisive for the 
range of possible anaphors. 
5 In Umbach (2004a) it is shown that the denotation of the OTHERS corresponds to 
the set of (proper) alternatives triggered by its co-referent, and vice versa. 
6 De Swart refers to an example given by Szabolcsi where others seems to relate 
to a co-referent established by a modified numeral: 
More than six of our students misunderstood the question. Maybe you will 
find others, too. 
This example may be subsumed under the caveat concerning the others-test 
because others here clearly means more students who misunderstood the question. 
In German, the use of mehr ('more') instead of andere C others') would be 
obligatory. Note also that the particle too is crucial for the example to be 
acceptable. Moreover, this example as well as her examples concerning monotone 
decreasing and non-monotone modified numerals involve comparative quantifiers 
(more than n N, less than n N), which might indicate that, contrary to the 
assumption throughout this paper, comparative quantifiers differ from superlative 
�uantifiers (at least n N, at most n N), cf. section 9. 
Krifka even includes determiners in the list of expression which can be modified 
by at least (at least some determiners aren 't determiners). I would rather assume 
that in this example at least operates on the NP denotation. 
S The representation in Krifka ( 1 999) is slightly different because he regards the 
number word as an adjective combining with a noun and a null determiner, 
�0 [three boys]] . 
To avoid misunderstandings, individuals can of course be joined. This is the 
basis of Link's plural ontology, establishing a join-semilattice. But the j oin of 
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individuals corresponds to natural language and, whereas the join of predicate 
denotations corresponds to disjunction. 1 0  In the end of his paper Krifka discusses a solution according to which at least 
phrases do trigger proper alternatives while their ordinary meaning is undefmed, 
which appears counterintuitive. Anyway these alternatives cannot account for the 
contrasts in (25). 
I I  For a comprehensive analysis of comparative quantifiers see Hackl (2000). 12 Compare also Simons, in this volume. 
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